Samo Burja covers the future of mass migration—why interest groups can implement mass migrations even in nations which haven’t yet done so, and what the ongoing wave of mass migrations will do to the world’s demographics.
Samo Burja on Twitter: https://x.com/SamoBurja
Ben on Twitter: https://x.com/benlandautaylor
Transcript
Intro (00:00)
Ben: I am here with Samo Burja, who is the founder of Bismarck Analysis and the editor-in-chief of Palladium Magazine. Welcome back to the show, Samo.
Samo: It’s always a pleasure.
Ben: And we’re here to talk about the future of mass immigration. And in particular, Samo has often said that a lot of the countries that currently aren’t doing mass immigration are going to start doing that in the future, in the not very distant future. So why do you think that, Samo, and which countries do you have in mind?
Why mass immigration is the default (00:39)
Samo: When we are discussing mass immigration, discourse has moved away from the claim that it’s not even happening to the claim that it’s inevitable. And I want the audience to understand that simply because I propose something is very likely to happen, I’m not actually an advocate for it, nor would I say that it’s automatically going to have good outcomes. I think that when it comes to migration in the modern world, allowing people to move to places where they receive significant economic benefits for having done so, and when I say economic benefits, this includes job opportunities, but it also includes welfare opportunities. It also includes criminal opportunities, right? The whole spectrum.
The path of least resistance is for governments to be sort of incompetent in carrying out the enforcement of their own laws. So there is just a general leakiness between countries, right? People might cross a border and work illegally, and if the country is not very good at controlling the border, just for reasons of state capacity, a significant number will cross the border. I don’t think all modern mass immigration is of this type, but if you were to see, for example, immigration between the United States and Mexico between 1930 and 1950, there was actually a massive wave. I don’t think that wave was ideologically motivated on the US side.
Actually, the US was in a politically immigration restrictionist mode after the 1920s and the immigration acts of that era. It was merely the movement of people and a bureaucracy just not being fit for purpose, not really trying to stop it, not necessarily even tracking who is employed where or who lives where very well. If you look at, say, African states today, they have a very limited ability to track people leaving or entering their countries. These are countries that exist almost more on paper than in reality. They’re not like Western-style functional bureaucratic Westphalian states.
China is actually such a state and actually probably has one of the strongest apparatuses for tracking its citizens and one of the strongest apparatuses for preventing entry or preventing exit even. I don’t know if you know this, but there are Chinese citizens who travel internationally, and you can actually report them to the Ministry of Tourism or something in China, and they’re going to go on a no-travel list because they don’t represent the country very well. This is kind of funny to consider given that, of course, the Chinese tourist is now a cornerstone of many world economies. If you go to my home country of Slovenia, you go to Ljubljana in the summer, you’ll hear American tourists and Chinese tourists because the Chinese are rich enough now to travel to Europe. So China is capable of controlling its border.
It’s not either a state that has failed to develop and become a modern state with the full set of state capabilities that African countries have, nor is it very negligent on matters of demographics. In fact, it historically has been overzealous on demographics when it came to issues such as fertility. The reason is that there is a bureaucratic incentive for immigration. The first way we could phrase it is that it’s a form of human quantitative easing—where essentially you are measuring a quantity. You can measure GDP.
You can measure population. You can measure number of students enrolled in your university. You can measure the price of unskilled labor at your company. These are all these measures that are, in a way, imperfect measures. And the incentive of many bureaucrats, of course, is to make number go up.
Making number go up is very important, and one of the easiest ways that you can make that happen is by just pretending that there’s no difference in quality of what you’re counting. To start counting apples as oranges and oranges as apples, and then you can say, “Oh, we have more fruit than ever,” rather than more apples than ever. This is not an indirect commentary on the human capital differences between populations. I’m actually talking about something very basic. It’s sort of like schools in China might be constituted for educating the people of China, but they need a certain number of people in the classrooms.
The university realizes we don’t have enough people enrolling this year. Ah, fortunately, there is a program to bring in international students.
Ben: This has certainly been very explicit in a lot of the American universities.
Samo: Not just American, but Australian universities. Because the students pay tuition, it is in a way a bailout of the dysfunctional institution. Sort of you have a second-rate university. Well, it’s failing to attract American students
Ben: The visas they offer are first-rate.
Samo: Exactly. And people want to live in America or they want to live in Australia, and they’re happy to make use of a student visa for that. And okay, well, the university gets its money, and from the perspective of that one bureaucracy, that university, they fulfilled their mission. They didn’t actually fulfill their more fundamental mission of educating the next generation of Americans or advancing the state of science, but they advanced this more narrow bureaucratic measure. So that’s why I would say that something like Goodhart’s law.
Goodhart’s law states that when a measure of a social phenomena becomes a target, like a bureaucratic target, a goal, it ceases to be a good measure. And I think this happens with essentially any institution oriented around mass processing of citizens or people in general. And then these institutions might recruit people to pad their numbers, even if the recruitment process itself undermines the original mission. Right? For example, in the US case, universities might receive a lot of funding to be the engines of American innovation.
Some of this funding probably comes from a national security justification of making sure the United States is the most advanced country in the world. And they might easily be now incentivized, actually because of some of these considerations, to recruit students who are basically doing a form of industrial espionage. And thereby actually what the US is then subsidizing and funding is the education of the next generation of Chinese engineers who then return at about a what? A 50% rate back to China? And I’m not even denying these are very smart people.
So that’s why I said earlier when I was saying counting as apples as oranges, that wasn’t a comment about which student is better. It was just a comment of you set up a quantifiable measure of people for a particular goal. The person in charge of fulfilling that quantifiable measure in any bureaucracy has then just that measure. That measure is what they optimize for. You could joke and say they’re disaligned, the disalignment of bureaucrats.
So this is in a way another aspect of the principal-agent problem.
Mass immigration to China (08:27)
Ben: Yes. And so I think I recall you saying that you expect throughout this coming century, we’re going to see something like probably hundreds of millions of immigrants into China in particular. Yes? And so you’re thinking there not just of universities, you’re thinking of something much stronger and more fundamental than that.
Samo: Yes, a very vast and deep population pressure. And people in the Western world have a lot of double think with regard to the question of immigration. Their first thought is, well, we’re better off than China because our population numbers are padded by basically immigration and the fertility of first-generation immigrants. So our fertility is not as catastrophically low as China. And China is going to just end up sort of being deeply impoverished because they are going to get old before they get rich.
They’re just going to have a massive population crunch because of their disastrous one-child policy, and they’re not going to do mass immigration. And I don’t understand where this view is from. You sort of believe that this is an extremely dangerous authoritarian government that does anything it needs to. It’s willing to intern the Uyghur in Western China. It’s willing to undertake state-backed industrial espionage.
It’s a dictatorship. That’s why they’re morally worse than us because they’re a dictatorship and we’re a democracy. And then you say, but they’re going to just roll over and have an economic crash because they’re not going to allow immigration? Look, the CCP is not automatically a Chinese nationalist organization at all. The Chinese Communist Party actually has the full ideological justification internally for something very close to Western multiculturalism.
They, for example, with the one-child policy made an exception for ethnic minorities in China, where the ethnic minorities such as the Tibetans and the Uyghur and the Manchu could have two children, not one before the policies kick in. And their view was that China actually it’s useful for the communist government for it to be defined as a multicultural society. The first flag of China you could joke that that was the original rainbow flag was the flag with the five colors representing the five races of China. The Manchu, the Mongol, the Chinese, et cetera. There’s a weird type of ideological multiculturalism already baked in very similar to the Soviet version when the Soviet Union the goal was not at first Russification.
The goal was sort of undertaking this communist revolution and actually developing the smaller ethnicities and nationalities and kind of using them politically as a base of power.
Which classes benefit from mass immigration? (11:29)
Ben: Yeah. So the part of this that I find myself more skeptical of is not the ideological part. I think ideologically states can be extremely flexible whenever they have a reason to. You can find the justification somewhere in the texts to do whatever it is that you want. It’s more about the premise of in order to solve economic problems we’re going to do this sort of demographic scale mass immigration where it just doesn’t in fact seem like that helps with...
It is often claimed that that helps economically, but when you look at the places that are doing a lot of it, in fact it doesn’t seem to be helping economically for various reasons. One being that when you look at, especially in Europe, but even to a lesser extent in the last few years in America, just the rates at which the immigrant populations work. In Germany or Denmark or somewhere, it’s shockingly low. In America, it’s not very different from the American-born population, but still the idea of, oh, this is going to be some sort of big buoy, as is sort of often said, doesn’t seem to actually pan out in reality. And my suspicion is that something along somewhere between...
I suspect a lot of this rhetoric, which doesn’t really hold up when you check, is not said because people earnestly believe it is true and feel strongly about the economic arguments, but because they are ideologically attached to it for other reasons, and this is sort of a useful thing that you can say about it in the arena. Or to the extent that it is earnest, it’s the sort of thing that just over time can be disproven by experience. And so when the time rolls around that the Chinese start looking for that, they’ll just look over and be like, “Oh, perhaps that doesn’t work. So if we’re having these economic problems, is that even going to help?”
Samo: Well, if a state is data-driven the way, say, Singapore is, yes, they might actually look at this data and they might correctly conclude that maybe we have to be very careful or very limited or limited to skilled immigration or basically act as a little bit of a tax shelter to attract people carefully measuring the economic benefits and costs. If, on the other hand, you are beholden to a political constituency, such as small business owners or large businesses, you do have a reason to pretend to believe that this assists the economic picture of the country overall if it assists the economic picture of the particular companies you are trying to please. So, for example, if the South Korean government is in conversation with Samsung, and they are asking Samsung, “What is the best thing we can do to help your margins?” A very easy answer by Samsung might be, “Actually, we need the cost of labor to be lower. We need to suppress the cost of labor somehow.”
So even if the arriving workers have negative externalities, such as, say, statistics of welfare usage, it does still actually reduce some of the inflationary pressure. In Western countries, you might notice this in something as trivial as Uber Eats prices or restaurants, but in the 1960s, the Gastarbeiter worker program provided relatively cheap labor for West Germany for its industrial manufacturing. You could imagine China actually in the near future running out of cheap Chinese labor, and then you have the option of either offshoring or the option of bringing labor in. And there’s a certain amount of labor that starts being brought in, at first at very narrow spaces. It’s sort of like, for example, the healthcare system that your country is proud of maintaining might be insolvent, such as the British NHS.
The NHS is unsalvageable. It cannot be funded. It cannot be saved. Its paper commitments radically exceed what it is able to fulfill. One way it can do this is to pretend that nurses trained in Kenya and Bulgaria are actually completely equally qualified to nurses trained in Britain, and thereby you let in 5 or 6 or 7,000 nurses or elder care workers.
For example, for pensioners. And we see in Japan, which is a country that many people have said would never accept immigration at any appreciable scale, the sort of chinks in the armor happen where 5,000 people here, 5,000 people here, 20,000 workers in this category, 80,000 workers in that category. The plurality of anecdote is data, the plurality of 1,000 small stakeholder organizations lobbying the government for their special exemption that allows them in their little field to sort of suppress their paper costs, offload any externalities on paper, remain successful in fulfilling their mission. The plurality of small immigration is mass immigration. So I think this kind of mass political pressure is hard to avoid in low fertility societies because, again, any bureaucracy that is tasked with managing people has a certain number of people they’re assuming.
A school without students has to close. A hospital with not enough doctors has to ration their access, and then if the access was legally mandated, oof, they’re now in trouble. And so on and so on. So I’m not saying that when you add it all up together, this saves the economy. I’m saying that it’s almost like a tragedy of the commons where all these dead player institutions sort of lobby for a cheap solution for themselves.
Ben: Yeah. As a means of basically trying in the tug of war between capital and labor.
Samo: Yeah. And look, that’s the reason why we went from a Japan that had maybe 50,000 residents to a Japan that has over half a million and will very soon have 5 million. And it’s non-linear. Once the mass immigration pathway starts from one country to the other, the immigrants in the country of origin share through networks and just word of mouth ways you can fulfill the legal requirements to receive immigrant benefits. They hear of various schemes that people from their country have come up with.
And if there’s any economic benefit at all, if the economic delta is there, you do see people move. And again, China’s not, even coastal China, is not as rich as Japan, but is as rich as Poland. And we see empirically in places like Poland where for now, let’s say mass immigration from the Muslim world is still politically impalatable. Okay, well they recruit then from India, they recruit from the Philippines, and they recruit quickly, and they open up quickly, and you have in a very short period of time go from essentially a few thousand people to a few hundred thousand people. So the scenario where hundreds of millions of people move to China, let’s say the scenario where 200 million people...
Sorry, the scenario where 50 million people move to China is the exact proportionate scenario to what we are currently seeing in Japan. So either you think that China is going to be hyper immune to this, or you sort of think that China will be about as, let’s say xenophobic, to use that slur, xenophobic as Japan. If you think China is going to be no more restrictive than Japan, you should be budgeting for 50 million immigrants into China, probably from South Asia, Southeast Asia, probably also Central Asia.
Ben: So it seems like the political economy difference which could lead to a pretty different outcome. When you’re talking about national governments that see as part of their sort of inherent job as making sure which some subset of the business owners is doing well, which seems—
Samo: That’s true
Ben: to describe Japan certainly, seems to describe South Korea.
Samo: Describes Germany.
Ben: Yeah. Describes—
Samo: Or used to
Ben: certain—yeah. And some other notable places seems to be a bit like Turkey, for example. And so yeah, it seems like this pathway, something would have to change in the way these things are functioning for this not to sort of be the default, at least currently. And it seems plausible to me that this is a sort of relatively fragile state that could change, but it seems like currently this is not the Communist Party of China seems much more like the companies are tools to be used to achieve particular ends, and if that means that they’re making less profit, then it sucks to be them. And so the idea that they’re going to be like, “We are going to do this large scale demographic things in order to protect their profits,” seems sort of at odds with the way that they have been managing the economy so far.
Is that still going to be true in 25 years? I’m not sure. This seems like the sort of thing that could absolutely decay as you get generational turnover in the Communist Party, but it doesn’t seem to be the way they are thinking today.
Samo: It’s not their default perspective, but there are aspects of this perspective and there are aspects of supporting the national champions. And let me point to other countries such as Russia and Belarus, which have also recently began recruiting workers for strategically important industries and sectors. Right? Russia both attempts to recruit soldiers to fight in the war in Ukraine, but also recruits workers, sometimes at state-level contracts. For example, they have an agreement with North Korea to have North Koreans go work in Russia in large numbers, and they pay the North Korean government.
Ben: Like how large numbers?
Samo: Like 40,000, 50,000.
Ben: That’s pretty large.
Samo: It’s pretty large, at least for North Korea. For Russia, again, it’s a small number. It’s a big country, but it’s not that big. They do come into the country and they do work there. And for North Korea, I even believe part of the deal is that they go back.
But these sort of state-level deals, again, the Gastarbeiter example in German history, West Germany, where you had the influx of Turkish workers into Germany shows that these type of deals often end up with a permanent settling of the population. It is a political exertion to allow people to come and is a political exertion to make sure that they return. So sometimes people just pay the first part and say, “We’ll do the second part later,” and they never get around to the second part. So this is before you have the I—
Ben: We’ve certainly done that in the US many times.
Samo: Of course, many times over in a stacking way. Or even, say, the deals in the 1980s around amnesty and the Reagan administration. The deal was supposed to be, okay, all the people who are here and hardworking and integrated, they get to stay, and we’re going to beef up the border so that we do not have more illegal immigration. The result was merely a one-time legalization of illegals, and the illegals kept coming.
The great emptying out (23:20)
Ben: Yeah. And so bracketing the question of likelihood and then just assuming for the sake of argument that this is the way it goes, what does that mean? What does that do to the world?
Samo: I think we could sort of discuss later even further why I think it’s very likely they would do it. But if we go for the sake of argument and say that China will accept immigration at about the rate of, let’s say, Eastern European countries, be they democratic like Poland or non-democratic like Belarus—
Ben: Or you mean at a similar rate in proportion to—
Samo: To the population. Yeah. So, again, what is 5% of China’s population? It’s like 80 million people. Maybe by the time this becomes relevant, they shrink because they are an aging population.
But even if they shrink pretty rapidly or if they’re lying and exaggerating their population because the one-child policy fallout was so embarrassing, let’s say there’s just a billion people in China 5% is 50 million people. 50 million people is enough to empty the Philippines. It does not make a huge dent in India, but it makes a huge dent in all of Southeast Asia. If China were to accept 50 million immigrants from Indonesia, that would notably decrease the economic output of Indonesia. And while it might seem unrealistic to have something like, Indonesia is a country of over 300 million people, while it might seem unrealistic to have 20% or 30% of a population move, again, Eastern Europe is an instructive example.
20% to 30% of Romanians after Romania entered the European Union of a certain age bracket just did go to Western Europe.
Ben: Yeah. I don’t think that’s too much more than the percentage of Mexicans who are currently in the US.
Samo: And Mexico is, by global standards, a fairly developed country, actually. It is much poorer than the United States. And then Indonesia, again, by world standards, it’s richer than India, but the difference between Indonesia and coastal China is significant and sufficient to motivate easily 30, 40, 50 million people to move. You might propose then that what would be a truly mass immigration society would be achieving the kind of numbers we see in countries like France, Sweden, Canada. Then we start moving into the domain of 300 or 400 million people.
300 or 400 million people taken out of the global labor pool is a sufficient number to raise global labor prices. Especially in a world of low fertility. Even these countries we think of as populous and high fertility, India’s fertility is below replacement and is dropping rapidly. There are provinces in India where the TFR, the total fertility rate, is 1.4. Japan’s TFR rate, I think, is around 1.3.
So these are places that are not even rich yet that have, in the last decade, experienced a massive population crunch. It is plausible to me, but far from certain, so I would put about 40% odds that we will see a very rapid drop in African fertility over the next 20 years. We might very soon go from a world where the entire world outside of Africa is aging very rapidly to a world where the whole world is aging very rapidly and there are not many young workers of any nationality. And if you then move 200 to 300 million people to a country, I think that’s significant to cause some countries to just be permanently poor. I think if you’re a poor country with low fertility and half of your workers leave, you will never, ever be rich.
Ben: Right. Because it’s not like each one flips a coin. You’re getting specifically the ones who have the energy and ambition.
Samo: Yes. So in a way, it’s the richest people from Africa that move. It is the people who can afford 4,000 to 5,000 euros to the human smugglers to truck you across the Sahel and then put you on a boat. And then the British government, for reasons we perhaps shouldn’t discuss here, escorts you with state-level honors to your government-mandated hotel.
Ben: Yes. Many people have theorized that one of the big reasons that the Nordic countries went from the Vikings burning down everything and stealing your stuff to being the incredibly polite and incredibly like, “Don’t you stick out too much,” is that all of the really ambitious ones were especially likely to move to the United States and left behind the ones who were, forget what they call it, the law of Jante or something?
Samo: The law of Jante, yeah, which is basically sort of a tall poppy syndrome—codified.
Ben: Which is certainly not what they were doing in the 1600s.
Samo: No. The culture changed massively and we can discuss. And a change in who leaves, right? A small proportion of the population leaving can have a deeply disproportionate impact on the whole trajectory of the country. That’s hardly surprising.
Ben: And 20% of the population leaving can have a much bigger effect.
The diplomacy of mass migration (28:34)
Samo: Yes. And I think that there’s also another aspect to this, which is international lobbying as well. If you are India or if you are Mexico, remittances are one of the most valuable sources of foreign currency. How does your government receive dollars in your economy? Well, partially it is the relatives of your citizens sending dollars or euros to your citizens who you then tax.
Okay. These countries include in explicit trade negotiations with other countries, such as the meeting between the European Union and India recently and other countries, a quota of accepting more workers or more migrants from the country. And certainly, the Mexican government has lobbied the United States to not deport its citizens back to Mexico. There is a way in which, yes, workers are valuable, but for government, currency can be much more tangible. It’s a good short-term incentive.
And in fact, maybe you will productively use that currency, or I don’t know, maybe you will steal it. That works too.
Ben: And they also just seem to sort of still see these people as their constituents. Just because they’ve left across the border to somewhere else doesn’t mean that we should stop looking out for their interests.
Samo: No, of course not. And honestly, if Americans or Western Europeans put themselves in a situation where 10 million Americans moved to Poland, oh, I guarantee you the treatment of the Polish government of those 10 million Americans would be a hot-button electoral issue in the United States.
Ben: Yeah. This is how Texas became a state.
Samo: Yes. Texas is a state that used to be part of Mexico, and then many, many English-speaking settlers came over the borders, pinky swore that they were now loyal Mexicans, and then they weren’t. Yeah. And because of this though, once you have that sort of initial foot in the door we discussed, driven by sort of like just dead player course correction, where you’re just trying to fill seats for students, or you’re trying to get cheap workers, or you’re trying to figure out how you’re going to fulfill your obligations like as a healthcare system or something like that. As those dead institutions provide that initial beachhead, followed by then a constituency of people from the rest of the world, it becomes a matter of international relations.
Right? So China will have profound interdependency with the entire planet for the rest of the 21st century. There’s an argument that China basically bailed out the United States. The recent Iran war produced a spike in oil prices. China released reserves, their strategic oil reserves, partially softening the blow of the global energy spike.
Why? Because they didn’t want a hiccup in the world’s economy. So on the surface, seemingly nonsensical, China helps Trump actually is deeply relevant. In a way, China perhaps will be in a situation where it’ll have to please many constituencies and many countries, and just out of self-interest, continue to pursue certain policies that perhaps are not good long-term policies or cause them to cooperate with their seeming enemies. You could easily imagine a situation where India starts to become more and more competitive with China and offers China a trade deal.
Accept 40 million of our citizens to go work in China. The remittances will be very helpful, allow remittances, and in exchange, the Indian market will be much more open to Chinese goods. China’s biggest problem is that there are not enough consumers on the planet to fund their industrial build-out. You could easily then imagine that these sort of trade deals would become more and more common, perhaps with African nations or with Southeast Asia, or with a rapidly industrializing country such as Indonesia. So I think the argument starts becoming stronger and stronger the more of these factors you add together.
Ben: And we’ve been talking about China partly because it’s just so big. But your thesis here is not just about China. You also mentioned Russia. I can see at a certain point, if the vacuum sort of sucks everything out of India, that India then starts—
Samo: Sucking people in
Ben: bringing in people from sub-Saharan Africa. And you sort of get this sort of like stepped chain thing going on. What else do you see happening in the world in this scenario?
Filling empty countries (33:04)
Samo: Well, some countries will be very empty. That doesn’t mean they’re going to stay empty. If you look at, say, the fertility of the Mennonites in, I believe, Paraguay, we might by the end of the century see, frankly, the honestly kind of funny image of a German-speaking Paraguay. Why? Because these Amish, basically Mennonite people, they still speak their own version of German, and they’re now at 2% of the population, but they double every generation.
And no one’s going to kick them out, and the country is very low fertility, and it’s actually poor enough that people move from these countries to Argentina and Brazil. It’s not even about moving to America, right? So some of the poorest countries in the world, ironically, might end up having some very strange religious communities from the rest of the planet come and fill up the vacuum, notably changing them. So it’s not just the most developed countries and the high population countries like America or Germany or Japan or China that end up being transformed by this global reshuffling. Some of the previously high fertility poor, but now very low fertility, very poor, and very depopulated places, that might end up being prime real estate.
Ben: And so do you think it’s going to be prime real estate only for people who are already there, or do you think that people are going to look around and be like, “Hey, there’s a bunch of empty space there?” Or I guess if the population is peaking and generally getting older, there may not be much of a rush for empty real estate.
Samo: I’m saying that we might see a situation in which poor countries do not mind religious weirdos who are pacifists moving into your country. And paying some taxes, right? I’m saying that there might be international... Let’s put it this way. After the graying of the planet is complete, and after the great migration first wave has happened, we might actually see a new age of settlement, and the groups that do it might be surprising.
At the end of the day, I don’t know, an ultra-Orthodox Jewish Brazil or a Mennonite Paraguay or an Amish Angola sound like kind of jokes, but you actually just have to run this for about a century before these are less jokes and more like, oh, of course, 10 to 20% of the population belongs to a strange group. And if I were to point out one country in the world that perhaps is already living in this strange future, it might be actually Israel itself, where the secular population has a low fertility, and there’s a large military-exempt, sometimes in some ways tax-exempt population rapidly growing. And it’s not the Palestinians, it’s the ultra-Orthodox Jews.
Ben: Right, which it’s a funny one to look at because by global standards, Israeli fertility is pretty high even when you exclude the ultra-Orthodox. But the ultra-Orthodox is just much higher, and if you have differential fertility and you just run that forward for several generations, that’s how the math works out. Exponents are quite powerful.
Samo: So we will see, I think, after the fertility crunch, anyone that is any community, and it does have to be a community, that is sufficiently outside of the distribution of this type of Western culture, or not Western, no. It’s not Western. At this point, it’s not even industrialized. It’s not even rich. It’s something very, very basic to the structure of, let’s call it the smartphone industrial society. I don’t even know how to describe it, because you cannot describe rural India as Western.
You can’t describe rural Iran as rich, right? That mold is broken. So really we’re talking about there is something about mass bureaucratic society where even if you put on an Islamist hat on it, and you on law say, I don’t know, do something extreme like repeal women’s rights or whatever, the fertility doesn’t go back up. So we’re really talking about totally separate communities from whatever this strange social contagion is, like the Amish or the ultra-Orthodox. So those communities might see range expansion that can only be compared to the range expansion of the original settlers of North America, where you would have people arrive from England and would end up having 10 kids, right?
Ben: Yeah. And so, we seem to have a regime where basically the Malthusian stuff ended up being totally wrong—because there was this assumption in there of people having as many kids as they’re able to, which is—
Samo: People do not do
Ben: done only by these odd communities at present. At present, they’re all very religious.
Samo: And very small.
Ben: Yes. And is that necessarily going to continue? Is someone going to figure out a non-religious way of doing this, or are they just going to continue being the same denominations that are doing it today, but just more of them? Hard to say.
Can automation keep up with aging? (38:13)
Samo: Well, let’s also talk a little bit about automation, which is often proposed as a solution. Jevons paradox is kind of true. When you automate some human tasks, but not all, the remaining humans are then the bottleneck on production or the bottleneck on that activity, have more leverage, and at times need to be even paid more. Right? So if the pace of automation is fairly slow, but automation is pretty extensive, which is, mind you, what we’re seeing in, for example, modern China or some other industrial societies like Japan and South Korea, that increases wages, that incentivizes further automation.
But it’s possible that the progress of technology and robotics is too slow. In a way, Japan in the 1980s funded the development of what they called the fifth generation computer, which was supposed to be a computer you could talk to and would understand natural language, among other things. Which we achieve today in 2026.
Ben: They were a little early.
Samo: They were a little early, but they undertook it because they were like, “Wow, if we want to keep on growing our economy, we will have to automate our economy because we tried everything to raise the fertility and it’s not working.” And they did not try everything. They just tried all the obvious policies like child tax credits, welfare, et cetera, all of the usual stuff that also Hungary tried more recently, and that I’m sure China will try in the near future, and I expect will not work in China any more than they worked in Hungary or Japan. However, maybe China is in time and the robots actually will be good enough. But the robots have to be really, really good and have to get better much faster, or you’re just increasing the sort of incentive to ask the question of, like, hey, a million Indonesians in Shenzhen would double the value of this strategically important company making the AI, for example.
Sorry, not the AI. Manufacturing the robots that are automating the rest of China. Why not loosen the restrictions? It’s a special economic zone. Maybe we have a special immigration visa for the special economic zone.
Doesn’t that sound like a sensible technocratic argument? Right? And it’s sort of like the company, in a way, the higher paid the labor, the more the incentive is of the heads of the company to try to reduce that cost of labor. So the H-1B visa in the United States was an example of this, where one of the strongest lobbies in favor of the H-1B one was the tech industry. Not because it’s good for tech workers like software engineers.
It was just good for the investors and the CEOs.
Ben: Yes. Because just basic supply and demand. You want the high supply of the thing you’re buying.
The lifecycle of state functionality (41:07)
Samo: So let’s say that the automation is not achieved. Full automation is not achieved. China’s going to be a massive industrial economy where your choices are close down the factory because the price of labor has gone up and the company’s margins have been eaten up by international competition, or extend the life of the company for one more quarter or one more year, and then your province has better economic numbers than the rest of China. And you can say, “I fulfilled the four-year or the five-year economic targets set,” and your career advances. So this is true both then of the sort of CEO level or the provincial politburo member.
And I sort of don’t think they’ll be able to resist that temptation. Chinese provinces are actually fairly cutthroat competitive with each other.
Ben: And in general, when you see a sort of political, economic structure that’s fairly young, they tend to be more focused on all of the mechanisms of how it works and is it really getting you to the end goal that you want. And as it sort of gets older and at later stage in its development—it tends to be the people who were focusing on sort of the whole chain of how everything works tend to just be dead and be replaced by people who are just sort of slotting into their particular, I’m supposed to be this cog doing this thing, maximizing that number. And right now, it’s at a sort of medium early, not super early because it’s basically under the political economy that was—approximately built under Deng Xiaoping. And so they seem to today still be pretty focused on does this thing actually serve the end goal? Not perfectly so, but certainly doing a lot better than a place like, say, England.
But it seems in the sort of natural life cycle of these things, you would expect that in another 15 years, another 30 years, that’s going to be somewhat decayed. There’s going to have been some generational turnover to people who are further from the original founding and the original theory of why things are done in this structure and are more prone to just trying to make their local number go up.
Samo: Even in a fairly highly functioning technocratic system where, let’s say, the founder of Singapore passed away not too long ago, and they are doing and pursuing a version of, let’s call it civic nationalism and even multiculturalism, that’s, I think, the most functional in the world. We are still talking about massive influx of people. Yes, they are very careful to preserve the ethnic makeup of Singapore. That is, they balance Indian, Malay, and Chinese immigration to preserve the rough political mix of the country because very pragmatically, their view is like, “Oh, this country blows up if one ethnic group thinks that they’re being disempowered by us empowering this other ethnic group by increasing its numbers.” Right?
So within Singapore, they have their own version of speech censorship laws to manage community relations. They have their own version of affirmative action to redistribute government positions and even sometimes economic positions to have stakeholders from all society. And they also have something like almost an explicit non-aggression political deal to like, well, the Chinese are not going to try to use Chinese immigration to make Singapore a purely Chinese ethnic state, and the Indians are not going to try to increase their numbers to take over Singapore either. This is our common polity. So in a way, you could say Singapore is the world’s most functional multicultural economics, pragmatics-driven state, but it only really embraced this because Lee Kuan Yew himself gave up on trying to raise fertility.
He said, “I tried. I couldn’t make it happen. That’s for the next generation of leaders.” The next generation of leaders in Singapore, as far as I can tell, are not even trying. Right?
Ben: And you’re still seeing them make this sort of same shuffle of we’re going to assume that a immigrant of Malay extraction is the same as a Malay from a family that’s been here forever. We’re going to assume—that a Chinese immigrant is the same as an ethnic Chinese that’s been here for 100 years.
Samo: Or that any portion of India will be the same as the Indian population we already have. Also clearly not true just because of the massive cultural differences. But because of that, again, Singapore’s demographics are pretty comparable to mainland China. So if you assume the most hardheaded, technocratic, normal bureaucrat you can think of, very smart people, actually, very high IQ people, with even founders of the system who are explicitly aware that this is a problem. Which, mind you, the founders of the Chinese system were not.
The Chinese stuck to the one-child policy way longer than it made any sense to, partially to not embarrass the bureaucrats and the politicians who had put it into effect for so many years. Because if you remove something and you even say you’re removing it because it’s terrible, that greatly disempowers anyone whose political career was bound up in it. So China, let me propose that the Chinese Communist Party is strictly less rational than Lee Kuan Yew on the topic of fertility. I don’t think that’s crazy. So, therefore, I predict China will be strictly worse at managing immigration and multiculturalism than Singapore.
And then Singapore, it’s not quite an authoritarian country, but it’s difficult to argue that it’s not a country where the national and state interest is not central and where companies are not somewhat subordinated to the state in a way, or rather, in a deep partnership with the state, right? Because they do want to be rich. And in fact, China wants to be rich. China wants to be very rich. It’s in fact a strategic national priority, and the most fundamental thing the CCP is judged on is actually the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which might sound completely opposed to accepting 300 or 400 million immigrants until you check the fine print which defines this as economically catching up to or exceeding the United States.
Which, mind you, by the way, is part of the motivation for Canadian mass immigration. They literally like, wow, the only way we can stay relevant next to this giant of a country, the United States, is if there are 100 million Canadians.
Ben: Well, it doesn’t seem to have been working out the way they hoped it would, but that’s often the way of these things, is you sort of—push all of the ways that the thing might not work under the rug, and you can spin a story in which everything goes exactly right that you then sell to your boss.
Samo: Yes. And what I’m saying is that I’m not even sure that in China they know mass immigration doesn’t work because all mainstream Western economists still, against all evidence and reason, claim that this is a good way to jumpstart economic growth, even though all of the sort of mass immigration states, except for the United States, have very sluggish growth, actually way worse growth than states that undertake [inaudible].
Ben: Yeah. It’s surprisingly close to a perfect inverse correlation.
Samo: Of course. And the denial by the economists based on their theories and moral preferences, not based on facts or data, is almost as unanimous. And the problem is, I think the Chinese don’t understand this. I think they respect our economists still. I don’t know why, but I think they do.
Ben: Well, we’ll see if they learn better before it becomes their turn. Well, great. Anything else we should make sure to get to on this subject here?
The next Migration Period and ethnogenesis (49:19)
Samo: I think that the most important observation might be that we live in a period that can only be compared to the movement of peoples or the barbarian invasions, whichever historical term you prefer, around the time of the fall of the Roman Empire. And perhaps if you looked deeper into history, the great migrations of peoples that happened during the Bronze Age and other periods. We are in a once in a thousand year reshuffle of global cultures, and states are simply not adapted to this. There is no state. States in the world today, when it comes to national interest and conflict, these are states with hundreds of years of tradition from a period where fertility was high, and civilizations with high fertility were agricultural societies where people were tied to the land just economically.
Right? We are moving into a world where the countryside is completely empty because farming is still automated. Urban populations have inherently less tie to their environment. Does an urban population, do you really care if you live in New York or Chicago? You kind of don’t, right?
You’re sort of proud of being a New Yorker, but if New York had a massive downturn and Chicago had 10% economic growth, I guarantee you that would have reshuffled a population.
Ben: Both you and I are many thousands of miles away from where we were born.
Samo: Exactly. And Detroit went from being the promising place you move to, to the terrible place you leave, significantly but not fully downstream of economics. The crime factor, the race riots, all of that mattered massively. But there was also an underlying economic transformation of the US car industry. So I think we’re going to see a map of the world, an ethnographic, a human map that is going to be completely different, and it will not be homogenized.
There’s really no reason for it to be homogenized. Currently in France, angry students are rioting and vandalizing and destroying things, and they’re waving Algerian and Palestinian flags. They are not waving Indian or Tibetan or Indonesian or Mexican flags. So in other words, even in a mass immigration world, there will not be a reshuffling, does not mean a homogenization. It just means the creation of new mixed identities, new mixed groups, and these will be different from each other.
So the sort of utopia, the I want to buy the world a Coke thing, and we’re all individuals, and the cultural differences go away and war stops, that will not happen.
Ben: Yeah. So all the previous great movement periods you were mentioning, they led to a bunch of populations just being in different locations. They led to a bunch of mixing and ethnogenesis and the arrival, sort of the emergence of new mixes of people, which then took on their own identity. And it sounds like you’re predicting this also 100, 150 years from now.
Samo: It might sound like a joke, but you might end up having a Chinese leadership talking about our shared Dharmic values or something like this, of a blend of the Chinese Indian identity of like, actually, we have always learned from India, Buddhism came from India. Or you might hear of an India where the Islamic part of the identity is greatly exaggerated. Or you might hear of an India where, oh, actually, we have to also reckon with the legacy of racism of the British Empire and our own anti-African prejudices against our new neighbors are the result of British imperialism, and we have to check our Hindu privilege. It sounds like a joke, but there’s a deep set of very politically adaptive rationalizations to decline or to state failure or state transformation, where you go from it’s happening, it’s not happening to it’s happening and it’s good, or it happened, it’s too late to do anything about it. And none of these states evolved in a world of mass migration of people.
If you had had a 100 to 200 years before the Industrial Revolution where huge groups of people would pack up and move like the Vandals did into Rome, and countries were under political selection for that type of migration, I think the political response would be stronger. So what I’m also here in a way predicting, and what I’ve said, a lot of this might be very upsetting to people who might think mass immigration is good, but I’m also going to upset the nationalists. The nationalism you knew developed in the agricultural age before the internal combustion engine, when peoples were rooted to where they were and they fought as organized groups rather than the mass sort of decampment of individuals to a new place. So I sort of feel like there will be anti-globalization, anti-immigration movements in the future, but they’re not going to look like the 19th century. It’ll look very different.
Ben: Cool. Well, thank you so much for coming on the show, Samo.
Samo: Yeah, a pleasure as always.
